the recent decision to roll out the 'Victims' Focus Scheme' across England and Wales, this article explores a number of issues of principle that arise -not least the deeper policy implications of an apparent re-alignment of the normative parameters of the criminal justice system to incorporate the private interests of third parties.
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I. Introduction
Over the course of the last 30 years or so, the problems facing victims in the criminal justice system have become ever more apparent. Successive governments have sought to capitalise on the lucrative political appeal of the crime victim, 1 and have implemented a range of reforms primarily targeted at providing additional support and protection for victims. As Ashworth has observed, more has been promised than delivered in recent years in relation to victim services, 2 though on the whole such reforms have received a relatively warm reception. However, the idea of conferring procedural rights on victims of crime (ie, the notion that they should be allowed to participate in the criminal process) has always proved much more contentious.
The concept of victim participation is nothing new; as long ago as 1990, probation officers, using either CPS papers or victim statements, were obliged to assess and comment on the impact of the consequences of the offence on victims in their pre-sentence reports. (London: Home Office, 1999) . Any VPS had to be in the form of a section 9 P o s t -P r i n t include comments about the impact of the offence in any statement they may make. 5 In September 2005, the Government was persuaded that it should take the concept of victim allocution one step forward, and decided to pilot the use of ‗family impact statements' in court. This was to allow the families of victims of murder or manslaughter to make an oral statement on the impact of the offence, post conviction but before sentence was passed. Thus, the Victims' Advocates Scheme (VAS) was established in five Crown court centres, and ran from April 2006 to April 2008 This article examines the VAS and its repackaged successor, the Victim Focus Scheme (VFS), against emergent international trends and the apparent realignment of the normative parameters of the criminal justice system. In particular, we consider the impact of how the ‗public' nature of criminal justice processes has been increasingly exposed to private interests, thereby exposing ideas about crime and punishment to more holistic understandings of concepts of harm, fault, retribution and reparation. These shifts are not without consequence: the capacity of the adversarial system to accommodate a proactive role for the victim is highly apposite -given its inherent conception as a two-way conflict between the state and the offender. The victim, it would seem, now stands on the brink of recapturing this conflict.
witness statement or in an expert's report and served on the defence before sentence was passed: the sentencing court should take into account, as far as it considered appropriate, -the consequences to the victim‖; see Practice Direction (Victim Personal Statements) [2002] Cr App R (S) 482. P o s t -P r i n t P o s t -P r i n t Calls for enhanced participatory rights for victims have rested on various different arguments. It is alleged, for example, that more meaningful participation contributes to overall levels of victim satisfaction and thereby bolsters the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole. 10 From a moral standpoint, it has been suggested that it is only right that victims have an opportunity to play a role in the delivery of punishment, since this can provide some measure of reassurance to them that they have public recognition and support. 11 On a more pragmatic level, it might be added that such statements ensure that courts are presented with a more complete picture of the crime and are thereby better placed to sentence the offender and order reparation to the victim.
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Yet even if we accept, wholly or partially, the validity of these arguments, we cannot escape the fact that victims' participatory rights are inherently foreign to the normative parameters of the English criminal justice system. In a seminal article, Nils Christie outlined an historical pattern, whereby the state ‗appropriated' the criminal conflict from the victim and thereby transformed a private dispute between individuals into a transgression against the state.
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Thus the parameters of ‗criminal' behaviour are laid down by the state to punish conduct that is deemed to be sufficiently injurious to the public at large.
In this sense, the interests of the victim in common law systems are notionally Chalmers, P Duff, and F Leverick ‗Victim impact statements: can work, do work (for those who bother to make them) ' [2007] Crim LR 360. 13 N Christie, ‗Conflicts as Property ' (1977) Accordingly, the need to take more explicit and effective account of it when sentencing for domestic burglary should be seen as a move in the right direction.
III. The Impact of Shifting Parameters
Just as the courts and policymakers have expanded the concept of criminal responsibility, there has been a parallel acknowledgement of the need to modify existing procedures to give the victim some means of participation. We suggest that there are four major factors that have come to exert pressure on the state / offender dichotomy that lies at the core of the adversarial conflict.
These are: (1) evolving standards for victims in human rights law; (2) emergent participatory norms in international criminal justice; (3) the rise of ‗therapeutic jurisprudence'; and (4) the apparent collapse of the public / private divide within sentencing and penal policy.
As we proceed to argue, it is the cumulative effect of these factors which, in our opinion, indicates a change, or softening, in the resistance against allowing greater expression of victim impact in sentencing. In particular, improving access to justice for victims has not only reflected developing trends in human rights and international criminal justice norms, but has also been balanced by a much greater recognition of the need for accountability. In other words, there is a broader acceptance that trial justice really does need to engage with victims' needs in a positive sense, and can no longer marginalise them for reasons of retributive ideology, or the exigencies of the adversarial contest.
1) Evolving standards for victims in human rights law
Although international instruments now require the interests of victims to be taken into account in a variety of ways, such standards tend to eschew P o s t -P r i n t stipulating specific requirements concerning the role they ought to play in criminal proceedings. Even if many soft law instruments make some reference to the inherent value of participation, the language adopted by some of them tends to be vague and non-prescriptive. P o s t -P r i n t à-vis the domestic criminal process, Rock cites the toddler's mother as saying that it was a ‗magnificent gesture' that she had been heard in this way since she had been precluded from doing so domestically.
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Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the Strasbourg Court will recognise a specific right for victims to participate in the sentencing process in the near future. It is perhaps more likely that the Court will continue steer a wide berth for some years to come since awkward conflicts may arise with the defendant's right to a fair and impartial hearing under Article 6(1). 46 However, in the longer term, it is equally conceivable that some form of participatory right may emerge as
Member States continue to make provision for it within domestic criminal law.
John Jackson has argued that the jurisprudence from Strasbourg in recent years has effected a shift in the way we tend to categorise systems according to the adversarial or inquisitorial spectrum, arguing instead that the Court has developed a new model of proof that is better characterised as ‗participatory' than as ‗adversarial' or ‗inquisitorial'. 47 However, even if any participatory rights do emerge in future years, it is likely these would be limited in nature. It is difficult to conceive the Court advocating the more radical approach adopted in many parts of the USA which allows victims to make specific demands as to the length or type of sentence to be imposed.
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It is not only the Strasbourg organs which have become increasingly receptive to the concept of victim participation. While the Pupino decision was primarily concerned with the need to protect vulnerable witnesses rather than to enable the effective participation of victims generally, its relevance to the VFS should not be overlooked. The European
Court of Justice has signalled that its days of sidestepping thorny questions of domestic criminal procedure are drawing to an end, and no Member State can consider itself exempt from the requirement that victims should be ‗heard'.
This will inevitably heighten the pre-existing tensions within the adversarial system. The extent to which the adversarial paradigm can effectively accommodate third party participatory rights is inherently limited, but the government might argue that the VFS represents one way of achieving this.
Only time will tell whether that will be sufficient; future questions may well arise as to the overall effectiveness of the mechanism given that it is unavailable to the vast majority of crime victims. There is no right for them to lodge a victim impact statement which must be taken into account in fixing the sentence. Arguably, as is the case with the ICC, the key lies in ensuring that:
 The rights given to victims are ‗real' in the sense that their ‗interests' 76 are actually factored into sentencing decisions.
 Sentencing judges are given the normative flexibility to achieve this.
 A positive duty is placed upon the Court to ensure that victims' rights do not jeopardise the rights of the accused or threaten a fair and impartial trial process.
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 An ideological shift takes place to underpin penal policy thereby allowing trials (and sentencing in particular) to maximise the normative flexibility to pursue more restorative outcomes for victims. Such an approach will make it easier for courts to reach beyond the immediate families of victims to take account of ‗interests' within the wider community when sentencing for serious crimes. 76 Clearly, the nature and scope of such ‗interests' and the purpose of victim participation need to be very carefully defined. One of the most important issues to be resolved is how these purposes might be linked to other sentencing aims and their achievement in concrete cases. 77 In this the state should assume a greater responsibility for ensuring that the trial fulfils the legitimate expectations of its citizens for ‗justice'. proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence are correct, such a setting will necessarily limit the cathartic potential of the criminal process for the victim.
The adversarial setting appears to be inherently limited in its capacity to P o s t -P r i n t more on the concept of harm than culpability, but also, the communitarian basis for the criminalization of certain actions and their consequences begin to assume a greater significance in the penal equation. Harm, it is submitted, should not be seen in purely objective terms, but should instead be related to victim and community perceptions of wrongdoing and the moral consequences of those judgments for those charged with delivering justice in the courts. In this way, the community becomes more directly responsible for the definition of harm and how to deal with its consequences through the criminal process.
To some extent, this trend towards a broader understanding of criminal harm is already discernible. As previously noted, conceptions of criminal responsibility within sentencing have expanded to take much closer account of the nature of the harm or loss suffered (or threatened) to the victim. This trend is even more marked when we consider the form of penalty that the criminal justice system is willing to impose. Since 1972 criminal courts have had the power to order an offender to pay a victim compensation for ‗any personal injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence', 106 and courts are now obliged to consider whether it would be desirable to make a compensation order and must give reasons for refusing to do so. 
IV. The VAS / VFS in Context
Although there may be signs of a re-balancing of the public/private interest towards victims, the rigidity of adversarial trial and the retributive justice model continue to act as significant obstacles to more comprehensive reform.
Arguably, the prospects for victim participation and the development of restorative justice strategies are unlikely to be further advanced within the 111 See further Doak, above n 18, Ch6.
112 Cavadino and Dignan, above n 11, p 237. the statements to be read by the prosecutor or judge, a significant minority (22%) had opted to present them in person. This was an opportunity that appeared to be valued by the families who did so, with the husband of one deceased victim telling the researchers that he was ‗doing it because I just felt I owed it.' 131 Moreover, the researchers noted that overcoming the fear of speaking in court on such an emotional subject had helped victims to feel empowered and more satisfied with the process. It was also reported that there was a perception among practitioners that family members felt they could have a greater personal impact and ‗do more to help' by delivering the FIS themselves. Although self-delivery of the statement tends to involve additional work for all stakeholders, it is regrettable that the therapeutic potential of the VFS has been curtailed by placing restrictions on the victim's role, rather than seeking to strengthen it.
As recent experience with the ICC illustrates, 132 effective engagement with victims, especially when gauging the impact of emotional harm, should be conceived in more holistic terms, to include both pre and post trial phases.
Seen against this background, 133 domestic initiatives such as the VAS and VFI represent very small advances in the notion of victim participation. Unlike, the ICC, there are no pre-trial rights of participation which, in the domestic context, could provide the right for victims to present testimony having a direct bearing on charging decisions, subject to the rights of the accused and the need for a fair and impartial trial. Similarly, the right of victims in ICC trials to lead or challenge evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused within the framework of agreed charges, and subject to appropriate fair trial 131 ibid, 21. Notwithstanding, these advances reflect a greater realisation of the international trial's transitional justice role, and its wider role as a fundamental pillar of governance in criminal justice. There are clear parallels here for domestic trial justice. For instance, it may be argued that shifts away from repressive forms of justice towards more hybridised forms of trial process are also transitional, in the sense that they represent a positive response to the failure of trial justice to engage with the justice expectations of the diverse groups and communities that comprise contemporary society. In this sense, therefore, fulfilling victims' rights of participation may symbolise a crossroads for trial justice.
Conclusion
The failure of the VFS to address the victim's therapeutic needs in a practical sense is a retrograde step. Paradoxically, however, it lends support to Sherman's case for an ‗emotionally intelligent justice system'. 137 Sherman envisages such a system working ‗like an emotionally intelligent political campaign or product marketing plan, one that is likely to employ disaggregated strategies based on research evidence about what messages 134 In the domestic context, this would challenge the adverse consequences of the adversarial distinction between verdict and sentence on establishing the factual basis for sentence. 135 In the sense that their evidence is less likely to be perceived as tainted by an economic motive than in the pursuit of establishing the ‗truth' of the events which constitute the facts alleged in the indictment. 136 See further K Ambos, ‗International Criminal Procedure: ‗Adversarial', ‗Inquisitorial' or Mixed? ' (2003) 
